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Torts, crimes and vindication: whose wrong is it?
r. a. duff
My concern in this chapter is with the implications of different conceptions
of tort law for our understanding of the relationship between tort law
and criminal law. I consider three conceptions of tort law (two quite brieﬂy,
a third in more detail); show how the third of them raises questions
about the relationship between tort law and criminal law; discuss some
ways in which we might then blur the distinction between the two kinds
of law; and try to identify what must remain as the core of criminal law.
1. Cost-allocation, civil recourse and vindication
A. Allocating the cost of harm
If tort law was as Lord Bingham portrayed it in Watkins v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department, it would be a relatively simple matter to
distinguish the respective aims and proper scope of tort law and of
criminal law. The ‘primary role of the law of tort’, he said, ‘is to provide
monetary compensation for those who have suffered material damage
rather than to vindicate the rights of those who have not’.1 So a prisoner
who wanted to sue the Home Ofﬁce, and the prison ofﬁcers who had
opened his correspondence with his lawyers in breach of the Prison Rules
and in bad faith, for the tort of misfeasance in public ofﬁce would have to
prove not merely that they had wrongfully violated his rights, but also that
he had as a result suffered material, or ‘special’, damage; absent such
damage, he would have no case under tort law. This suggests a simple, and
familiar, picture of the respective operations of tort law and criminal law.
Grateful thanks for helpful comments are due to Matthew Dyson, to Nick McBride and to
seminar participants at the Utrecht Centre for Accountability and Legal Liability Law.
1 Watkins v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395,
[9]; quoted by J. Steele, ‘Damages in tort and under the Human Rights Act: remedial or
functional separation?’ (2008) 67 CLJ 606, 607.
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Tort law, on this simple view, is concerned with harms and where their
costs should fall. Its processes aim to allocate the costs of harm: to ensure
as far as possible that they can be allocated away from those who
innocently suffered them and onto those who are properly held respon-
sible for causing them; to enable the innocent harm-sufferers to secure
either a complete remedy, or at least compensation, for the harms that
they suffered. This leaves open a range of questions about the principles
that should determine such systematic cost-allocations – for instance,
whether they should be grounded in considerations of justice, or of
economic efﬁciency: but such questions are not our present concern.
Criminal law, by contrast, on an equally simple view, is concerned not
with allocating the costs of harm, but with allocating punishment for
wrongs. The substantive criminal law purports, in its offence deﬁnitions,
to deﬁne wrongs whose perpetrators ought to be punished (for reasons
of retribution, or of prevention), and the criminal process is the proced-
ure through which we can determine where punishments should fall,
and how severe they should be.
This simple picture does seem apt for a wide range of tort cases: quite
often, what a claimant properly seeks is precisely to secure the repair of,
or a more or less adequate compensation for, some material damage
that she has suffered, from the person or body at whose (negligent) hands
she suffered it. It also neatly explains some of the salient differences
between the two kinds of legal process: why a tort case is brought
and controlled by the claimant, while a criminal case is brought and
controlled by the polity; why tort law should involve a less demanding
standard of fault, and a less demanding burden of proof, than criminal
law; why pre-trial settlements without any admission of liability should
be encouraged in tort cases, but not in criminal cases; and why insurance
against tort awards should be allowed, or even required, whereas one
cannot insure oneself against the penal burdens that ﬂow from a criminal
conviction.2
But the simple, cost-allocative, picture of tort law is, of course, far too
simple: tort law is not always (even if it is sometimes) in the business of
(re)allocating the costs of harm that has been caused. Tort law, many
would argue, is not (just) about repairing or providing compensation
for harms, but about providing suitable remedies for wrongs; and such
wrong-focused accounts can make it harder to draw any clear or simple
2 See further R. A. Duff, ‘Repairing harms and answering for wrongs’ in J. Oberdiek (ed.),
Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford University Press, forthcoming, 2014).
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distinction between the proper aims of tort law and of criminal law –
especially when we address more sophisticated accounts of criminal law
than the very crude account at which I gestured above. I will not attempt
here to survey the entire range of competing theories of tort law; I will
instead note two that do very clearly raise difﬁcult and interesting
questions about the relationship between criminal law and tort law,
and discuss just one of them in more detail. My aim in discussing these
accounts is not to ask whether either of them offers the best or most
illuminating account of tort law – as if we should aim to explain all of
tort law in terms of just one kind of aim or function – it is rather to note
that they capture a kind of aim that a cost-allocative model cannot
capture, but that seems to be one that the law should enable injured
claimants to pursue; and to ask how that kind of aim relates to or
connects with the aims that could plausibly be ascribed to the criminal
law and the criminal process.
B. Civil recourse as remedy for wrongs
Consider ﬁrst the ‘civil recourse’ model of tort law as developed by
Goldberg and Zipursky.3 Civil recourse is a process through which
one who has been wronged can bring a suit against the wrongdoer.
The primary purpose of the suit is not, as it is on a cost-allocation model
of tort law, to secure damages or compensation: it is to hold the wrong-
doer to account, and to secure from the court a verdict that he is liable,
for the wrong; only after such a ﬁnding of liability does the question of a
remedy for that wrong arise.
The attractions of such a model should be obvious. Civil recourse
offers the wronged person a process through which she can, on her
own account, seek appropriate redress from the person who wronged
her. That redress might ultimately involve a monetary award, since that is
still, on this account, the default remedy in tort cases; that award might
be calibrated to the cost of any material harm or loss that she suffered.
But such an award is not the initial point of the process: the initial aim is
to determine the alleged wrongdoer’s liability, and to hold him account-
able for the wrong if it is proved. Thus when bereaved parents sue the
hospital whose negligence, they claim, caused their child’s death, they will
3 See especially B. C. Zipursky, ‘Rights, wrongs, and recourse in the law of torts’ (1998) 51
Vand LR 1; J. C. P. Goldberg and B. C. Zipursky, ‘Torts as wrongs’ (2010) 88 Texas LR 917
and Torts (Oxford University Press, 2010).
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if successful be awarded ‘damages for bereavement’ that the law sets at
£10,000:4 But their aim in suing is not, we must hope, to secure any such
sum as compensation that might even partially cover the ‘costs’ of the
harm of their child’s death: it is rather (it should be, as an aim that
the law should assist) to call to account the body that wronged their
child, and thus wronged them; it is to secure a formal, public verdict of
liability, and thus to secure an accounting for that wrong – an accounting
that will, ideally, involve a recognition of that wrong by the hospital, and
an apologetic explanation of how it came to be committed.
Now it might seem that tort law as a process of civil recourse is still
clearly distinguishable from the criminal law: although both deal with
wrongs, civil recourse is a process through which the wronged victim
can hold the wrongdoer to account, whereas criminal law is concerned
with the punishments that we are collectively to impose on those who
commit ‘public’ wrongs. That distinction begins to blur, however, once
we ask more carefully what kind of ‘recourse’ the tort process can
provide, on this view; and once we see the criminal process not simply
as a process through which the allocation of penal burdens is determined,
but as a communicative process of calling alleged criminal wrongdoers
to account.
On this view of criminal law, the substantive criminal law’s offence
deﬁnitions purport to deﬁne wrongs that merit the polity’s formal con-
demnation. In its procedural mode, the criminal law then provides for
a formal response to the alleged commission of such wrongs – a response
that makes their wrongfulness salient. The criminal trial calls the defend-
ant to answer to a charge of criminal wrongdoing. If the prosecution
can prove that he committed the offence charged, he must then answer
for that proven criminal conduct: he must either offer an exculpatory
defence, or be convicted; and a conviction condemns his conduct
as criminally wrongful. That censure or condemnation is then given
material force by the punishment that normally follows a conviction:
for punishment can also be seen as a forceful attempt at communication,
which aims to make real the offender’s accountability for his crime.5
The criminal process is thus a process of calling, and holding, to account.
Something similar is also true, however, of the tort process as a mode
of civil recourse. The defendant is called to answer to the claimant’s claim
4 Fatal Accidents Act 1976, s. 1A(3), as amended.
5 See further R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and liability in the criminal law
(Oxford: Hart, 2007); and ‘Towards a modest legal moralism’ (2014) 8 Crim Law& Phil 217.
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that he wronged her, and a verdict in favour of the claimant precisely
holds the defendant accountable for the wrong that has been proved;
as we saw, such a calling to account and such a ﬁnding of accountability
are the primary aims of a civil recourse process. Furthermore, if we ask
how an award of monetary damages could amount not merely to pay-
ment or compensation for such harm as the claimant suffered, but to a
remedy for the wrong that was done to her, we will see that it can do so
only if it is punitive: only, that is, if it is intended as a burdensome
imposition on the defendant that aims to give material force to his
accountability for the wrong that he committed.6
Thus it seems that both a civil recourse tort process, and the criminal
process, are processes through which alleged wrongdoers are called to
account; both are processes that can lead to the imposition of punitive
burdens on defendants who are held liable. It will then be harder for a
civil recourse theorist to explain some of the differentia between tort
law and criminal law that a cost-allocative theory can quite easily
explain: the kinds of defence that are available in criminal law, for
instance, should surely now also be relevant in a tort case, as excul-
patory ways in which a defendant can answer or account for his
allegedly wrongful conduct; if the damages that a civil court awards
have a punitive meaning, it is not clear that we should be able (let alone
required) to insure against them. We must also now ask more carefully
how tort law, understood as civil recourse, and criminal law should
relate to each other. For if both aim to identify wrongs whose alleged
perpetrators are to be called to public account through a judicial
process, if both attach punitive burdens to ﬁndings of liability, what
distinguishes their aims and functions – and how should the legal
labour be divided between them? I will not pursue these questions
about a civil recourse model of tort law here, since very similar ques-
tions are raised by another conception of what tort law is (sometimes)
about – a conception of tort law as vindicatory.
C. The vindication of rights
The key issues are raised in Ashley v. Chief Constable of Sussex Police.7
The police mounted an armed raid on Mr Ashley’s house at 4.20 a.m. As
6 I develop this argument in more detail in Duff, ‘Repairing harms’ (n. 2 above).
7 [2008] UKHL 25, [2008] 1 AC 962: see N. J. McBride, ‘Trespass to the person: the effect of
mistakes and alternative remedies on liability’ (2008) 67 CLJ 461; P. Palmer and J. Steele,
150 r. a. duff
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 6 Title Name: DYSON
Date:25/4/14 Time:10:11:04 Page Number: 151
the police rushed in, Mr Ashley (having just been woken) got out of bed,
naked and unarmed; he was shot and killed by a police ofﬁcer. The ofﬁcer
was charged with murder, but was acquitted on the judge’s direction,
since there was no evidence to rebut his claim that he acted in self-
defence – that he believed he was being attacked, and used force that was
reasonable given that belief. Members of Mr Ashley’s family then sued
the relevant chief constable for, inter alia, negligence and false imprison-
ment in relation to the planning and conduct of the raid, and assault
and battery in relation to the actual shooting. The defendant admitted
negligence and false imprisonment, and agreed to pay both compen-
satory (‘basic’) and aggravated damages in relation to those claims, but
denied the assault and battery; he then argued that the assault and battery
claim should not be allowed to proceed because, ﬁrst, this would amount
to a ‘collateral attack’ on the acquittal of the ofﬁcer who shot Mr Ashley;
and, second, no further damages could be awarded even if the claim
succeeded.8
The House of Lords rejected both these arguments (the second only
by a 3:2 majority), for reasons that bear directly on our topic. As to
self-defence, the court held that while in the criminal law an honest but
mistaken belief that one was subject to lethal attack could ground a
defence even if the belief was unreasonable, in tort law the defendant’s
mistaken belief must at least be reasonable if it is to ground a defence:
the ofﬁcer’s acquittal on a criminal charge of murder therefore left room
for a court to ﬁnd for the claimant in a tort claim for assault and battery –
to ﬁnd, for instance, that the ofﬁcer acted in an honest but unreasonably
mistaken belief that Mr Ashley was attacking him. Indeed, some of the
law lords were tempted by the view that self-defence could provide a
defence in tort law only if the belief was actually true (or at least, if
mistaken, grounded in the victim’s conduct in such a way that he could
be said to have brought the violence on himself); but since that had not
been argued by the claimants, it was not a possibility they could pursue.
‘Police shootings and the role of tort’ (2008) 71 MLR 801; S. Parsons and B. Andoh,
‘Private defence and public defence in the criminal law and in the law of tort – a
comparison’ (2012) 76 J Crim L 22; more generally, K. Barker, ‘Private and public: the
mixed concept of vindication in torts and private law’ in S. G. A. Pitel, J. W. Neyers and
E. Chamberlain (eds.), Tort Law: Challenging orthodoxy (Oxford: Hart, 2013), 59; S. Smith,
‘Duties, liabilities, and damages’ (2012) 125 Harv LR 1727.
8 It seemed clear that the defendant’s admissions of liability on the other claims were
intended to ward off any trial of the assault and battery claim: see Lord Scott’s comments,
[2008] 1 AC 962, [23].
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As to the second issue, the court held that even if succeeding in their
claim could bring the claimants no further monetary award, given what
had already been conceded, the claim should be allowed to proceed:
the claimants could properly seek a formal declaration by the court that
Mr Ashley had been subjected to a tortious assault and battery.
Underpinning both holdings was a conception of tort law as providing
for the vindication of rights: a vindication that might then be given
material form in an award of vindicatory damages, but that could consist
simply in an authoritative declaration by the court.9 That is why a claim
can be allowed to proceed even if its success could produce no increase in
the amount of damages the claimant might receive; and that is why, as we
will see in more detail shortly, the criteria for the self-defence defence are
quite properly different as between tort law and criminal law. By looking
more closely at these two points, we can see how closely a vindicatory
account of tort law is related to a civil recourse account, and how (in the
law lords’ eyes) tort law as thus understood is to be distinguished from
criminal law.
If I complain that another person has violated my rights, and she
denies it, I might then seek vindication—vindication of my claim to have
been wronged, and of the rights that were, I claim, violated. Such
vindication might be provided informally, by others who express their
support for my claim, and condemn the violation – or even by the
wrongdoer herself if she comes to accept that she wronged me; but if
the right that is violated is recognised as meriting legal protection, what
tort law offers me on this view is a way to secure an authoritative, formal
vindication of my rights by a court’s judgment. A court vindicates rights,
Barker suggests, ‘when it acts positively to afﬁrm them’, by ‘prevent[ing]
their infringement, . . . declar[ing] them publicly, . . . enforc[ing] them
speciﬁcally . . . [or] revers[ing] the effects of their infringement’.10
Our focus here must be on public declaration, in particular on declar-
ations occurring after the right is infringed, but we should note that
other modes of vindication must also be generally available. It might be
true in some cases that the only mode of legal vindication available to a
9 On vindication in civil law, see generally R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford University
Press, 2007), 59–91; D. Pearce and R. Halson, ‘Damages for breach of contract: compen-
sation, restitution and vindication’ (2008) 28 OJLS 73; N. Witzleb and R. Carroll, ‘The
role of vindication in tort damages’ (2009) 17 Tort LR 16; Steele, ‘Damages in tort and
under the Human Rights Act’(n. 1 above); Barker, ‘Private and public: the mixed concept
of vindication in torts and private law’(n. 7 above).
10 Barker, ibid., 68.
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wronged person is a formal, ex post declaration that her right was
violated; but if such declarations are to constitute authentic vindications,
they must be more than mere words: they must bring with them a
commitment to take such steps as may be possible to prevent infringe-
ments, or to reverse their effects. If the law provided only for the formal
declarations, but offered no substantive remedies for such wrongs, it
would not vindicate the rights at issue. That is why ‘vindicatory’ damages
may be appropriate: their award gives material force to the declaration of
the right, and to this formal recognition of the wrong. Vindication and
civil recourse seem to go hand in hand: one who seeks civil recourse
seeks to call to public, formal account the person who wronged her; if she
succeeds, the court provides a formal vindication of her claim to have
been wronged, by holding the defendant liable for that wrong. It also
provides, if it awards her damages that are at least in part ‘vindicatory’,
a kind of punishment for the wrongdoer: vindicatory damages are, like
those provided by civil recourse, essentially punitive, in that they can
serve their expressive, symbolic purpose only if they are burdensome for
the defendant.
This brings us back to a question that civil recourse raised. If the civil
process is one through which an alleged wrongdoer is called to public
account; if its purpose is to vindicate a right that was violated by declar-
ing that it was violated and by imposing a punitive burden of damages on
the violator: how does it differ from, or relate to, a criminal process
through which an alleged wrongdoer is called to public account and, if
proved guilty, is rendered liable both to a formal declaration of his guilt
(a conviction), and to a burdensome punishment? Theorists of punish-
ment sometimes suggest, explicitly or implicitly, that it serves a vindica-
tory purpose – even that it serves to vindicate victims’ rights:11 so are we
to say that the aims of tort law and of criminal law overlap in this
signiﬁcant way (which would raise further questions about the division
of labour between them)?
Answers to this question were suggested in Ashley, and can be ﬂeshed
out by looking at the reasons why the criteria for a defence of self-
defence should differ as between criminal law and tort law. ‘One of
the main functions of criminal law’, argued Lord Scott, ‘is to identify,
11 For explicit appeals to vindication, see e.g. M. D. Dubber, Victims in the War on Crime:
The use and abuse of victims’ rights (New York University Press, 2002); H. A. Bedau and
E. Kelly, ‘Punishment’ in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy plato.
stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment), s. 4.
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and provide punitive sanctions for, behaviour that is categorised as
criminal because it is damaging to the good order of society’; by
contrast, the ‘main function’ of tort law ‘is to identify and protect
the rights that every person is entitled to assert, and require to be
respected by, others’, and, in cases in which rights conﬂict, to ‘strike a
balance between the conﬂicting rights’. He apparently took it to
follow from this that in criminal law, but not in tort law, ‘no one should
be punished for . . . the consequences of an honest mistake’.12
Lord Carswell argued that whereas ‘[t]he criminal law has moved in
recent years in the direction of emphasising individual responsibility’
(so that even an unreasonably mistaken belief can ground a defence
of self-defence), ‘[t]he function of the civil law is quite distinct. It is to
provide a framework for compensation for wrongs which holds the
balance fairly between the conﬂicting rights and interests of different
people’.13 It might not be at once clear what the connection between
the criterion for criminalisation identiﬁed by Lord Scott and the focus
on ‘individual responsibility’ might be, and tort law could in any case
be said to be in the business of determining ‘individual responsibility’;
but the thought here reﬂects Blackstone’s classical formulation of a
conception of crimes as ‘public’ wrongs. Whilst civil wrongs infringe
‘the civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as
individuals’, crimes:
are breach and violation of the public rights and duties, due to the whole
community, considered as community, in its social aggregate capacity
. . . [B]esides the injury done to individuals, [crimes] strike at the
very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist, where actions of
[that] sort are suffered to escape with impunity. In all cases the crime
includes an injury: every public offence is also a private wrong, and
somewhat more; it affects the individual, and it likewise affects the
community.14
Furthermore, criminal law, unlike tort law, is in the business of con-
demning and punishing such wrongs: but condemnation and punish-
ment are legitimate only if they are imposed for culpable wrongdoing,
which is what explains the criminal law’s focus on ‘individual
responsibility’. We can put the matter more clearly by saying that
while both criminal law and tort law are concerned with determinations
12 Ashley [2008] 1 AC 962, [17–18]. 13 Ibid., [76].
14 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1765–9; available at avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/blackstone.asp), Bk IV, ch. 1, p. 5.
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of individual responsibility, the different functions of the two types
of law require different criteria of responsibility, or of liability.15
Criminal liability is liability for the culpable commission of a wrong,
which merits condemnation and punishment; the focus of the criminal
trial is on whether the defendant committed such a wrong. Tort liabil-
ity, by contrast, is liability for the infringement of the claimant’s
legally protected rights, which requires a formal acknowledgement
and (if possible) remedy: the focus of the tort case is thus on whether
the claimant suffered such an infringement at the defendant’s hands.
The conditions of liability may therefore differ between the two con-
texts. We cannot explore the full range of such differences here, but
can illustrate the point by returning to the example of self-defence.
In two kinds of case, the basic question that is asked in each kind
of case receives the same answer. If D mounted an unprovoked attack
on P without justiﬁcation or excuse, he is criminally liable as having
culpably committed the wrong of battery, wounding or homicide; and he
is civilly liable as having violated P’s right not to have such violence used
against her. On the other hand, if P had mounted a potentially lethal
attack on D, and D had used reasonable force to repel it, D is neither
criminally nor civilly liable: he did not culpably commit a criminal
wrong; P cannot complain that her rights were violated or even infringed,
since the right that others not subject me to violence is not a right that
they not subject me to violence even if I attack them.16 Matters become
trickier, however, if D acted on the basis of a mistaken belief that P was
attacking him – a belief such that, had it been true, the violence he used
would have been reasonable.17
Suppose ﬁrst that his belief, although he did hold and act on it,
was quite unreasonable: that is, he had no good reason to believe
that P was attacking him. English criminal law still allows him a defence
15 I think it is clearer to talk in this context of liability than of responsibility: see Duff,
Answering for Crime (n. 5 above), ch. 1. See also the discussion by Sullivan in Chapter 4 of
this volume; as well as Goudkamp’s comments on the ‘defendant-oriented agenda’ of the
criminal law as contrasted with the ‘bilateral structure’ of tort law in Chapter 8 (text
following n. 33).
16 There is much more to be said about how we should understand the right of self-defence
and its relationship to the rights of the attacker, and matters become more complicated
when we consider cases of ‘innocent attackers’ or ‘innocent threats’ who threaten
(perhaps intentionally) another’s life, but cannot be held culpable for doing so. Fortu-
nately, we need not consider these issues here; we need only say that if I intentionally use
injurious force against a culpable attacker, I do not infringe her rights.
17 On the wider issues here, see Goudkamp’s Chapter 8 in this volume.
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of self-defence,18 but the court in Ashley made clear that he could not
claim a tort defence. Lord Scott’s explanation of this difference was
not helped by his apparent sliding back and forth between issues of
justiﬁcation and of excuse,19 but it is easy enough to reconstruct the
relevant argument. One who acts on the basis of such an unreasonable
belief cannot claim that he was justiﬁed in acting thus: the most he can
claim is an excuse. But an excuse leaves intact the claim made by P that
he violated her rights: as is often said, while justiﬁcations might negate
the wrongfulness of the action justiﬁed (on which I will comment below),
an excuse admits that my action was wrongful, but denies that I should
be blamed for it;20 the fact that D had an excuse for what he did cannot
negate the wrong that he did to P. Thus D might hope to avoid being
condemned as a culpable wrongdoer; but he must still recognise that he
has wronged P, and that he owes her something to mark his regretful
recognition of that wrong.
It might be said that this difference between the criminal and the civil
law simply reﬂects the way in which the criminal law is still unduly in
thrall to legal subjectivism: that we should treat a mistaken belief in the
context of self-defence as we now treat it in the context of rape, and allow
it to exculpate only if it is reasonable.21 There is certainly merit in this
argument, but it does not affect the point at issue here, since the reasons
for not allowing unreasonable mistakes to ground a defence differ
between criminal law and tort law. In tort law, what matters is whether
the fact that D acted in the belief that P was attacking him negates the
violation of P’s rights that his use of violence prima facie involved;
the answer must be that it cannot. By contrast, in criminal law the
question is whether that fact negates D’s culpability: this question
embroils us in the debates between ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ concep-
tions of criminal liability, which (at least as far as defences are concerned)
do not bear on the tort law question, since they do not bear on whether
the claimant’s rights were violated.
Suppose now, however, that D’s belief that P was attacking him was
reasonable? This must, even in the eyes of those who would not allow
18 R v. Williams (Gladstone) [1987] 3 All ER 411; see Ashley [2008] 1 AC 962, [17] (Lord
Scott).
19 [2008] 1 AC 962, [18].
20 See classically J. L. Austin, ‘A plea for excuses’ in his Philosophical Papers (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961), 123, 125.
21 See Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1; it is curious that in Ashley Lord Scott seemed to have
forgotten this change in the law of rape: [2008] 1 AC 962, [18].
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unreasonable beliefs to exculpate, save him from a criminal conviction;
but should it bar civil liability? Some of the law lords in Ashley saw force
in the argument that it should not,22 and we can see now why they were
right. We need ﬁrst to distinguish two kinds of case: in one, what
gives D good reason to believe that P is attacking him is precisely P’s
own conduct – more precisely, P acts in a way that she knows will
give D good reason to believe that she is attacking him; in the other,
D’s reasons for that belief are grounded in something other than P’s own
conduct – for instance, in what others told him about P.23
If P gave D good reason to believe that she was attacking him, Lord
Scott thought that ‘the rules relating to contributory fault can come into
play’.24 It matters, of course, how P’s conduct gave D reason for this
belief: did she intend to induce it; or realise that he would or might form
it; or fail to attend sufﬁciently to the risk that he would do so; or act in a
way that she could not have been expected to know would give D any
reason for such a belief? In the extreme case in which P deliberately
induces the belief, we might not talk of ‘contributory fault’, as if there was
a violation of P’s rights for which P herself was at least partly to blame,
but class it with cases in which P is indeed attacking D;25 in other cases
we might talk of contributory fault. The crucial point, however, is that
insofar as we can say that P wilfully gave D good reason to believe
that she was attacking him, she is ill placed to complain if he then uses
force to ward off the supposed attack: whether we say that her rights were
not then infringed (as in cases of real self-defence), or that their infringe-
ment was justiﬁed by her conduct, or that she was to blame for their
violation, or that she is estopped from demanding a remedy from D,26
her conduct gives D a defence. He also has a criminal defence: if he
acted on a reasonable belief, based on such grounds, his use of violence
against P did not display the disregard for her rights that could warrant
conviction.
What of the case in which D’s belief was based on something other
than P’s wilful conduct: for instance, on the brieﬁng he was given before a
police raid in the course of which he shot P, or on information that P was
22 See [2008] 1 AC 962, [20] (Lord Scott), [55] (Lord Rodger reserving his opinion), [89–90]
(Lord Neuberger, noting the question open but leaving it open); contrast [76] (Lord
Carswell, rejecting the argument).
23 Ibid., [20] (Lord Scott), [54] (Lord Rodger), [91] (Lord Neuberger). 24 Ibid., [20].
25 Cf. the discussion of self-defence and reasonable belief in A. Ripstein, Equality, Responsi-
bility, and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 191–201.
26 Cf. McBride, ‘Trespass to the person’(n. 7 above), 463.
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an armed and dangerous escaped criminal who had already tried to kill
other police ofﬁcers?27 Even here, the belief’s grounds would surely need
to include something done by P—getting out of bed and moving towards
D, reaching for the glove compartment in the car: but P’s conduct is
entirely innocent in both fact and P’s conception of it, and interpreted as
threatening only in the light of such other factors as what D was told by
others. Some might deny that a belief (one on which D is to act) that is
not warranted by P’s own wilful conduct should count as ‘reasonable’,
but that seems too strict: it could surely sometimes be reasonable for D to
misinterpret P’s conduct in the light of what he was told by sources
whom he had no reason to mistrust, especially if D had also taken
whatever steps he could reasonably take to verify that information.
We might hold that in the case of consent to sexual penetration, a
mistaken belief should count as reasonable only if it is grounded in the
conduct of the person whose consent is needed – that a D who believes
that P consents only because her husband told him that she did or would
consent is not acting in a reasonable belief in her consent:28 but in the
context of self-defence, when waiting to make further checks might be
fatal, that requirement seems too harsh; there may be cases in which
D uses violence against P on the basis of a mistaken belief that P is
attacking him, and in which that belief is both reasonable and not
something for which P could be plausibly said to share responsibility.
D certainly then has a defence to a criminal charge; but should he have a
defence if P sues him for assault and battery?
It might be argued that, since D’s conduct is in that case justiﬁed, he
should have a defence against both the criminal charge and the civil suit.
But that would be too quick, for two reasons. First, there is room for
familiar dispute about whether in such cases of ‘putative justiﬁcation’
we should say that D’s conduct is justiﬁed (because he acted reasonably
on the basis of a reasonable belief); or that it was excusable (because the
force he used was not actually necessary to protect himself, but he was
not culpable for using it given his reasonable belief); or, perhaps, that it
was neither justiﬁed nor excused, but ‘warranted’ (because he acted
27 We could imagine a suitable version of Stephen Waldorf’s story here: he was an innocent
person who had the misfortune to be sitting in the car of the supposed girlfriend of an
escaped prisoner who had previously shot at police ofﬁcers; the police ofﬁcers who shot
him, in an attempt to capture him, claimed that he reached for the glove compartment
and that they believed he was reaching for a gun.
28 Cf. the facts of DPP v. Morgan [1976] AC 182: even had the defendants’ story been true,
they would have been (properly) convicted under s. 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.
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reasonably but wrongly on the basis of a reasonable but mistaken
belief).29 If we should describe D’s conduct as excused, or as warranted,
rather than as justiﬁed, we should also accept that P has been wronged,
although D is not to be blamed for that wrong; and what P is claiming, in
a vindicative tort suit, is recognition of that wrong. Second, even if we
should count D’s conduct as justiﬁed, that does not settle the question
of whether P’s claim should succeed. If P was actually attacking D, or
wilfully gave D good reason to believe that she was attacking him, D’s use
of force is justiﬁed as consistent with P’s rights – P is not wronged. But if
what justiﬁes D’s action is something other than P’s wilful conduct, we
should rather say that P is justiﬁably wronged; her rights are justiﬁably
infringed. Putting the matter in this way captures the crucial point that
P was an innocent victim who was deliberately harmed even though she
had done nothing to warrant or invite such violence.
We cannot embark here on a full discussion of the question of whether
justiﬁcations should always be taken to negate wrongfulness, so that if
D’s action is justiﬁed it is consistent with P’s rights; or should sometimes
be taken to justify the commission of a wrong, or the infringement of P’s
rights.30 My own sympathies lie with the view that we should at least
sometimes talk of the justiﬁed infringement of rights, which is also a way
of talking about the justiﬁed commission of wrongs; but even those who
reject such a view should accept that in a case in which D’s action is not
justiﬁed by P’s own wilful conduct, P had a claim – the claim not to be
subject to deliberate violence at D’s hands – that has not been met,
through no fault of P’s; and that even if D’s action is justiﬁed,
P therefore now has a legitimate claim to vindication – to some formal
recognition of and response to the frustration of his claim not to be
subjected to such violence. It is true that the character of that recognition
and response might be conditioned by a recognition that D’s action was
justiﬁed, as it might be conditioned if D had an excuse for his conduct;
but if we are to take P’s right-related claims seriously, if we are to give
them (and P) the respect that is required, we must take notice of their
frustration. That taking notice need not always involve a formal legal
29 For an argument for this suggestion, see Duff, Answering for Crime (n. 5 above), 271–7.
30 On the latter view we would distinguish ‘infringements’ from ‘violations’ of rights: to say
that P’s rights were infringed leaves open the possibility that that infringement was
justiﬁed; to say that they were violated is to say that the infringement was not justiﬁed.
But see J. Oberdiek, ‘Lost in moral space: on the infringing/violating distinction and its
place in the theory of rights’ (2004) 23 Law & Phil 325.
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process: it might be enough that D offers P an apologetic recognition of,
and perhaps material reparation for, what he did to her. However, if the
right upon which D’s conduct impinged is one that merits legal recogni-
tion, P should be able to seek formal, public vindication through a legal
process – which is what makes a vindicatory tort law appropriate.
Here is the position we have reached. When a legally recognised and
protected right of P’s is, through no fault of P’s, infringed by D, P can
legitimately seek vindication: that vindication might be provided volun-
tarily by D, without a formal legal process; but if D is not willing to do
this, P should be able to seek legal recourse – a formal vindication of her
right in a court of law. Sometimes, it might be said, such vindication can
be provided by the criminal court, which, in convicting D of a criminal
attack on P, thereby vindicates P’s rights: but, especially if the focus of the
criminal law is as Lord Scott described it in Ashley, this does not seem
adequate. Even if D is convicted, P might feel left out of the process:
for she did not initiate or control it (D is called to account by Regina,
not by P); in addition, if Lord Scott is right, what D is called to account
for is not the wrong that he did to P so much as the damage he did ‘to the
good order of society’.31 There are also, as we have seen, cases in
which D is entitled to a criminal acquittal, because his action was
excused, or justiﬁed on grounds other than P’s own wilful conduct, but
in which P is still entitled to some vindication, which is clearly not
provided by D’s acquittal. It might emerge during the trial that P’s rights
were (justiﬁably or excusably) infringed; but given the focus of the
criminal trial, that might not emerge clearly, and is not given formal
force in the acquittal. What tort law, understood in vindicatory terms,
then offers P is precisely a process through which she can seek and obtain
the vindication that she is entitled to expect, but that the criminal process
does not offer her.
Might this then offer us a neat (at least in principle) distinction
between criminal law and tort law – at least the elements of tort law that
are concerned with the vindication of rights? Criminal law is concerned
with conduct that threatens ‘the good order of society’. We will therefore
have reason to criminalise D’s infringement of P’s rights if and because
it has such implications for or effects on that good order; and we must
so deﬁne criminal offences and defences that D will be liable to convic-
tion only if his conduct threatens that good order unjustiﬁably and
31 Ashley [2008] 1 AC 962, [17].
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inexcusably. The vindicatory aspect of tort law, by contrast, is concerned
with the vindication of rights when they have been infringed or violated –
with providing a formal recognition of and remedies for such infringe-
ments and violations; the kinds of excuse or justiﬁcation that might
save D from criminal liability might therefore not save him from tort
liability.
This distinction, however, seems too neat—as well as leaving under-
explained the idea of the ‘good order of society’ as the primary focus of
the criminal law; in particular, it seems to remove the wrong that P has
suffered from the focus of the criminal law in a way that should worry us.
I will explain this problem, and explore some ways of dealing with it,
in the following section.
2. Civil and criminal wrongs
A. ‘Public’ and ‘private’ wrongs
Lord Scott’s comment that ‘behaviour . . . is categorised as criminal
because it is damaging to the good order of society’ locates him ﬁrmly,
as we saw, in a familiar tradition of attempts to explain the distinctive
realm of criminal law: crimes are ‘public’ wrongs, and what constitutes a
wrong as ‘public’ is that it has some adverse wrongful impact on or
implications for ‘the public’, i.e. the polity as a whole.32 We might talk
of ‘the good order of society’ that the wrong threatens, or that would
be threatened if such wrongs could be committed with impunity; of the
‘social volatility’ that such wrongs produce;33 of the ways in which they
undermine the trust on which social life depends;34 or, more abstractly,
of the unfair advantage that those who commit such wrongs take over
all those who refrain from them.35 The effect of such accounts is to
separate the particular, substantive wrong done to the victim of a crime
(when there is a victim) from the wrong done to ‘the public’; this might
naturally lead us to suppose that the wrong done to the victim should fall
within the realm of tort law, as a matter for him to pursue by a civil suit if
32 See Ashley [2008] 1 AC 962, [17], and text at nn. 12–14 above, in particular Blackstone’s
account of crimes as public wrongs.
33 L. C. Becker, ‘Criminal attempts and the theory of the law of crimes’ (1974) 3 Philosophy
& Public Affairs 262.
34 S. Dimock, ‘Retributivism and trust’ (1997) 16 Law & Phil 37.
35 E.g. R. Dagger, ‘Punishment as fair play’ (2008) 14 Res Publica 259.
torts, crimes and vindication: whose wrong is it? 161
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 6 Title Name: DYSON
Date:25/4/14 Time:10:11:07 Page Number: 162
he wants vindication or a remedy, while the wrong done to the public is
the proper concern of the criminal law.
This kind of separation ﬁts the two salient differentia between a tort
process and a criminal process. First, the tort process is controlled by
the claimant, since its focus is on her wrong – the wrong done to her:
if the wrong is hers, it should be for her to decide whether, and how far,
to pursue it. The criminal process, by contrast, is controlled by the polity,
since the criminal wrong is theirs: it is for them collectively, through the
delegated authority of their ofﬁcials, to decide whether and how to
pursue it. Second, a successful tort suit leads to an award that aims
to beneﬁt the claimant: she receives the damages, apology, or whatever
other remedy the court orders, since it is she who seeks vindication
or remedy for her wrong. A successful prosecution, by contrast, leads
to a punishment that is not intended to beneﬁt the individual victim: it
is a collective matter for the polity, not something that should be left to
the discretion of the individual victim – which is why it is so natural to
talk of offenders as paying their ‘debt to society’ through punishment.36
Insofar as criminal punishment should be understood in retributive
terms, it should be a matter for the polity, not for the individual victim,
to determine whether justice demands the imposition of a penal burden
on the offender. Insofar as its aims are preventive, that is also a matter for
the polity rather than for the individual victim. Tort law serves the
interests of individual victims of wrongs, and provides for the recognition
and enforcement of their rights. It deals with wrongs that are ‘public’ in
the sense that they are recognised as wrongs by the law, which provides a
process through which those who suffer them can call those who commit
them to public account; they do not belong only in the ‘private’ spheres
of our extra-legal lives.37 But they are ‘private’ in the sense that they are
seen as properly belonging to the particular claimant (and defendant)
whose interests are at stake.38 Criminal law, by contrast, serves the public
interest – the collective interest of members of the polity in the
36 Or indeed, in the eyes of contemporary penal policy makers, of ‘community payback’
rather than ‘community service’. I leave aside here the complicating possibility of
compensation orders: see text at n. 51 below.
37 See A. Y. Lee, ‘Public wrongs and the criminal law’ (2014) 8 Crim Law & Phil
(forthcoming).
38 Notions of ‘the public interest’ might ﬁgure, as they did in Ashley, as potential reasons for
not allowing a tort suit to proceed; but that is to say only that the law here as elsewhere
might bar the pursuit of private interests if it would impinge adversely on the public
interest.
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preservation of good order and of the other requisites for social life, and
in the demands of justice. Or we might talk, in more abstract terms,
of the public interest in the preservation and vindication of the values
by which the polity deﬁnes itself as a political community: we could say
that whilst tort law vindicates the rights of individuals who have been
wronged, criminal law vindicates the Right – the values that crimes
violate. Tort law thus overlaps with criminal law in that the same conduct
might constitute both a tort and a crime (although we should not forget
that many criminal offences are not also torts, since they lack any
identiﬁable victim who could be a claimant); but they do not deal with
the same wrongs.
However, this kind of separation between the private wrongs that
properly concern tort law, and the public wrongs that properly concern
criminal law, is problematic, for several reasons. It does not sit well with
the way in which prosecutors describe the crimes with which defendants
stand charged, or judges describe those crimes when sentencing convicted
offenders: for in the case of victimising crimes, the focus is on the substan-
tive wrong that the defendant (allegedly) did to the particular victim.
Prosecutors and judges do not usually describe the crime of the murderer,
the mugger, the rapist, the burglar, in terms of the damage it did to good
order; they focus on what was done to the individual victim. Furthermore,
this seems right: if the criminal case was focused instead on the kinds
of public interest sketched above, this would add further force to the
familiar complaint that it does not do justice to victims. The charge might
not now be that the criminal law ‘steals’ their ‘conﬂicts’,39 since on this
view the victim’s ‘conﬂict’ is left to be pursued through the civil law; the
charge is rather that it fails to give victims the recognition and support to
which they are entitled. It is as if we collectively say to them, ‘Our concern
is with the public interest, and the wrong done to us collectively; if you
want to pursue your wrong, that is up to you’. That way of putting it is
admittedly distorted, since we provide the civil process through which the
victim can pursue ‘her’ wrongdoer – a process that can lead to an authori-
tative verdict in her favour and an enforceable remedy. It is still true,
however, that on this view the polity leaves the victim with the burden of
pursuing her own grievance – a burden that is not just material (though
legal aid could be made available) and psychological, but moral: it is left to
her to take up the task of calling the person who wronged her to account.
39 See, famously, N. Christie, ‘Conﬂicts as property’ (1977) 17 British Journal of Criminology 1.
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It might be said that I have misrepresented the relationship between
the victim’s wrong and the public interest considerations that warrant
criminalising the wrongful conduct: that the wrong done to the public
interest is not the focus of the criminal process, as I portrayed it above,
but a condition that must be met if we are to treat the wrong done to the
individual victim as a public, criminal wrong. A criminal trial is still
focused on the substantive wrong done to the individual victim; but that
kind of wrong can become the business of the criminal law only because
it has further implications for the public interest. Even this seems inad-
equate, however, since it implies that we take a collective interest in the
victim’s wrong only because that will protect or beneﬁt our collective,
public interests.40 If we are to accord each other the ‘equal concern and
respect’ that citizens of a liberal polity should be able to expect,41 we
surely owe the victims of serious wrongs something more than this. What
more we owe them, in this context, could be described as solidarity:42
if we are to treat them as fellow members of the political community, we
must not just recognise (as if from a detached perspective) that they have
been wronged, but must share in that wrong with them – we must make
the wrong not just his or her wrong, but our wrong.43 To make it our
wrong is not to make it our wrong rather than the victim’s, or to ‘steal’ it
from her: rather, it is to make it clear (and true) that we stand with the
victim, as a ‘we’ that includes the victim, against the wrongdoer. He is still
called to answer for the wrong that he did to the victim, not for some
distinct wrong that he did to us; but in virtue of our community with the
victim, we treat the wrong as one done not (just) to the victim, but to us
collectively. Rather than leaving the victim with the burden of calling the
wrongdoer to account, we join with the victim, and call him to account
to us. (We also owe solidarity to the alleged wrongdoer. This is partly
because what we begin with is often not an undeniable wrong done to an
40 We might even be accused of using the victim and her wrong as a means to our collective
good, in a variation on the familiar objection that preventive penal practices use those
punished as means to some social good.
41 See R. M. Dworkin, ‘Liberal community’ (1989) 77 California LR 479.
42 Cf. R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge University Press, 1989): one
need not share Rorty’s particular brand of anti-foundationalism (or ‘postmodernism’ in
one of the many senses of that term) to recognise the importance of his emphasis on
solidarity as the cement of a liberal society.
43 See further S. E. Marshall and R. A. Duff, ‘Criminalization and sharing wrongs’ (1998) 11
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 7–22; ‘Public and private wrongs’ in
J. Chalmers et al. (eds.), Essays in Criminal Law in Honour of Sir Gerald Gordon
(Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 70.
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undeniable victim, but an alleged wrong done to a complainant; not an
undeniable wrongdoer who is to be held to account, but an alleged
wrongdoer who should be protected against over-hasty condemnation.
It is also because we owe solidarity even to undoubted and proven
wrongdoers, as well as with their victims: they too are, and must be
recognised and treated as, fellow members of the polity.44)
On this view, criminal law (or at least the criminal process) is quite
closely related to tort law understood as offering vindication: in both
the criminal and the civil context, the process is one through which
an alleged wrongdoer is called to account by, and to, those whom he
wronged – the individual victim, or the whole polity standing with the
victim.45 We might say something similar about criminal offences that
lack any identiﬁable, direct victim whose wrong we could collectively
share. There are many such offences, including most obviously many
so-called mala prohibita, consisting in the breach of regulations that
serve some aspect of the public good, or to protect us collectively against
certain kinds of harm; offences of endangerment that might expose no
identiﬁable individuals to direct risk; offences of defrauding the public
purse; and offences that threaten the effective operations of our essential
institutions and services. In these cases, we may say, the polity as a whole
is the only victim, and it must therefore be the polity that calls the
wrongdoer to account.
This might suggest that every legally cognisable wrong should be
deﬁned either as civil or as criminal, but not both: it should be pursuable
either as a tort through the civil courts or as a crime through the criminal
courts, but that no wrong should be both a tort and a crime, since if a
wrong is pursued as a crime that provides its victim with such vindica-
tion as the law should offer. This would leave us with an in principle neat
process of deciding the proper scope of both tort law and criminal law.
We begin with an account of the realm of public wrongs, wrongs of
which the law should take cognisance;46 we then decide which of those
wrongs should be torts, to be pursued by their victims if they so wish, in
order to obtain vindication for themselves; and which should be criminal,
to be pursued collectively as wrongs that we share with the victim.
44 See further R. A. Duff, ‘A criminal law for citizens’ (2010) 14 Theoretical Criminology 293.
45 For this view of the criminal trial, see R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. E. Marshall, V. Tadros, The
Trial on Trial (3): Towards a normative theory of the criminal trial (Oxford: Hart, 2007).
46 On this process, and how it must be grounded in a political theory of the res publica or
public realm, see further Duff, ‘Towards a modest legal moralism’ (n. 5 above).
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But, apart from the question of how we are to go about making such
decisions, matters are not that simple, even in principle.
B. Tort processes and criminal processes: blurring the boundaries?
There remain three important differences between the tort process and
the criminal process – differences to do with ways in which the criminal
process focuses on the defendant, and the tort process on the claimant/
victim.
First, a criminal process results, if the prosecution proves its case, in a
verdict that constitutes an unequivocal censure of the defendant as a
wrongdoer, which is not true of a tort process. The point is not just that a
tort verdict for the claimant does not carry a formally or explicitly
censorial meaning in the way that a criminal verdict of ‘Guilty’ does –
although that is certainly important. More than that, as we saw in the
previous section, while a tort verdict for the claimant declares that
the defendant wronged her, it might not declare that he did so culpably;
he might have had a justiﬁcation or an excuse that should save him from
censure without negating the claim that he wronged the claimant. At the
same time, a criminal process that leads to an acquittal can, as we have
seen, leave the wronged victim without the vindication that she might
reasonably seek: it leaves undefeated the presumption of innocence – that
the defendant did not culpably wrong the complainant; but it may be
silent on whether the complainant was wronged by the defendant.
Second, though the damages awarded to a successful claimant who
seeks vindication must, as I suggested, have a punitive meaning, they are
still crucially different from criminal punishment.47 Their focus is on
what is owed to the claimant, if not as compensation then by way of
apologetic, symbolic reparation; but although it is common to talk of the
debt that offenders owe to ‘society’ and pay through punishment, trad-
itional justiﬁcations of criminal punishment do not portray it in such
compensatory or reparative terms. Some portray it as a matter of retri-
bution, which seems to focus on what is owed to the offender by way of
punitive suffering rather than on what he owes to others. Others portray
it in preventive terms, as aiming to deter, to incapacitate, or to reform
47 And damages awarded to a claimant who was wronged by a non-culpable defendant are
not straightforwardly punitive. They are apologetic, expressing a recognition of the wrong
that the defendant owes to the victim; but they do not mark the defendant’s culpable
guilt.
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potential offenders; but whilst tort damages might play a deterrent role,
that does not seem to be their primary function.
Third, the criminal process is still controlled not by the claimant/
victim, but by the polity: we do not just offer the victim our solidarity
and support, but insist on providing it – on making the victim’s wrong
our own, whether she likes it or not. In fact, of course, victims can often
stop the prosecution of the person who wronged them: they can choose
not to report the crime, or not to tell the police what they know;48 they
can ask that the case be dropped, and the prosecutor might accede to that
request. But they have no formal standing either to initiate or to drop
prosecution, whereas in a tort case the claimant remains in control.
There are various ways in which we could reduce, if not eliminate,
these differences – either by reconceptualising aspects of the criminal
process, or by reforming it. As to vindication for the victim, one could
suggest, ﬁrst, that criminal trials should mark the logical and normative
distinction between offences and defences more clearly in their proced-
ure: the ﬁrst stage of the trial would be concerned with whether the
defendant committed the offence charged; if that was proved, the second
stage would be concerned with whether he could offer a defence. Proof of
the offence at the ﬁrst stage, as a presumptive wrong for which the
defendant must answer, would then provide vindication for victims
who were non-culpably wronged. That would not quite deal with the
problem of vindication, since some defences involve claiming that the
‘victim’ was partly or wholly responsible for the crime (self-defence being
the most obvious example, and consent another): but we could also
suggest, second, that courts should have to produce reasoned verdicts
that explain the grounds on which the defendant is either convicted or
acquitted, so making clear whether, in the court’s judgment, the com-
plainant was wronged. This suggestion, especially in the case of jury
trials, has some challenging implications, but also has some independent
plausibility, as a matter of due process.49
48 I leave aside the question of what duties victims might have to report the crimes they
suffered, or to assist their prosecution: see S. E. Marshall, ‘“It isn’t just about you”: victims
of crime and their associated duties’ in R. A. Duff et al. (eds.), Criminalization: The
political morality of the criminal law (Oxford University Press, 2014).
49 See, e.g., Lord Justice Auld’s Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales
(London: HMSO, 2001), 168–73 and ch. 11 (though his recommendation that juries
should be required to give reasons goes along with other recommendations about how
their role and discretion should be constrained).
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As to punishment, some argue that we should transform the criminal
process into something more like a civil process by abandoning punish-
ment in favour of compensation or restitution,50 and criminal courts can
make a compensation order against a convicted defendant ‘instead of or
in addition to dealing with him in any other way’.51 We could also, and
more plausibly, portray criminal punishment in ways that give talk of
debt-paying more purchase. One who commits a criminal wrong thereby
incurs a reparative debt: he owes reparation (apologetic reparation that
addresses not just any harm caused, but the wrong done) to those he
has wronged – not just to the direct victim, if there was one, but to the
whole polity; criminal punishment is (or should be) the exaction of that
debt. There are different ways of understanding that debt, and how
punishment can pay it. We might talk, for instance, of the communi-
cation of an apologetic recognition of the wrong done, and of punish-
ment as giving material force to that communication.52 Or we might
argue that the offender can pay the debt by undergoing the punitive
burden imposed by a penal system whose justifying aims are deterrent,53
incapacitative, or reformative. I am not here trying to defend such
accounts of criminal punishment (or such proposals for its abolition):
my point is only that if we understand tort damages as attempts not (just)
to provide compensation for harm that was caused, but to make repar-
ation for wrongs that were done, we can also see punishments imposed
by criminal courts as closer in their meaning to the damages awarded by
civil courts.
As to the victim’s role in, or control over, the legal process, we could
follow the example of some European systems, and give the victim-
complainant a larger, formal role in decisions about prosecution and
also in the trial itself. We could, for instance, provide that prosecutions
for some offences should proceed only at the request, or only with the
50 E.g. R. Barnett, ‘Restitution: a new paradigm of criminal justice’ (1977) 87 Ethics 279;
D. Golash, The Case against Punishment: Retribution, crime prevention, and the law
(New York University Press, 2005); D. Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
51 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, ss. 130–133. Indeed, if the court
considers both a ﬁne and a compensation order appropriate, but the offender has
insufﬁcient means to pay both, compensation should take priority: s. 130(12).
52 See R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford University Press,
2001); C. J. Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A philosophical theory of punishment (Cambridge
University Press, 2008).
53 See V. Tadros, The Ends of Harm: The moral foundations of criminal law (Oxford
University Press, 2011).
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consent, of the victim;54 or give the victim the right to seek a review of
prosecutorial decisions not to proceed;55 or have some cases prosecuted
by the victim;56 or allow the victim to join the case as a co-prosecutor;57
or allow the victim to attach her claim for compensation to the criminal
case.58 All these possibilities go well beyond the limited provisions made
in English and American criminal trials for Victim Impact Statements,
Victim Personal Statements, or sentencing proposals by victims,59 and
can be seen as giving more substance to the idea that the wrong being
tried by a criminal court is not just our collective wrong, but the victim’s
wrong in particular.
I’m not here advocating any of these strategies either in our conceptu-
alisation of the criminal process or in its actual operations; they are at
best controversial, and at worst deeply problematic. My point is only that
these are ways in which we could decrease the gap between our current
tort and criminal processes, so that we see both as processes through
which alleged wrongdoers are called to answer to those they allegedly
wronged, and (if the wrongdoing is proved) required to make suitable
reparation to them. Why should we do this? One reason is to work out
whether the criminal process could do more to offer victims the kind of
vindication that they must now seek through tort law; whether it could
do more, when the wrongs with which it is dealing are directly victimis-
ing wrongs, to recognise the direct victim’s distinctive standing. The third
54 Cf. the German category of Antragsdelikte (e.g. Strafgesetzbuch §§ 123, 185–94, 248b);
Polish Criminal Code §§ 160.3, 161, 190 (thanks to Krzysztof Szczucki for information
about Polish law). Cf. also Stevens’ suggestion, in this volume, Chapter 5.1.D that ‘where
crimes are only such because they constitute interpersonal wrongs, the victim should
have control over whether a prosecution is brought’.
55 As is now provided in England: see Crown Prosecution Service, Victims’ Right to Review
Scheme (www.cps.gov.uk/victims_witnesses/victims_right_to_review/index.html), and
R (B) v. DPP [2009] 1 WLR 2072.
56 Cf. the German provisions for Privatklage (Strafprozessordnung §§ 374–94); and Polish
Criminal Code §§ 212, 216–7, ss. 157.2–3, 160.3, 190.1.
57 Cf. the German provisions for Nebenkläger (Strafprozessordnung §§ 395–402), and the
French provisions for instituting or joining in a criminal prosecution as a ‘partie civile’
(see further, Spencer’s Chapter 11 in this volume, text preceding n. 17).
58 See e.g. Strafprozessordnung §§ 403–6; and the Swedish provisions described in
C. Lernestedt, ‘Victim and society: sharing wrongs, but in which roles?’ (2014) 8 Crim
Law & Phil 187.
59 See, e.g., Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victim personal statements’ (http://www.cps.gov.
uk/legal/v_to_z/victim_personal_statements/); A. J. Ashworth, ‘Victim impact statements
and sentencing’ [1993] Crim LR 498; E. Erez, ‘Victim participation in sentencing: and the
debate goes on . . .’ (1994) 3 International Review of Victimology 17.
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issue noted above, about who has an active role in calling the alleged
wrongdoer to account, is central here: the victim’s role in our existing
criminal process is often a purely passive one – at best, as the person to
whom the wrong was done and to whom something is now owed;
perhaps we should reconceptualise the legal role of victim in more active
terms of what rights and powers victims should have.60 This raises a
number of issues, which we cannot pursue further here, about just what
the criminal process should offer victims or demand from them. It might
be argued, against the suggestion that they should have a more active
role, that we must preserve a clear separation, as the distinction between
tort and criminal law preserves, between the victim’s private interest in
seeking some remedy for her wrong, and the public interest in the
prosecution of crimes; but part of the point of suggesting that we should
see crimes as shared wrongs was to suggest that the victim’s wrong is
taken up into the public realm, and itself becomes the public wrong with
which the criminal law then deals. What is true, however, is that on this
view the victim appears at the trial not simply as a private individual,
but as one of the collective ‘we’ who share the wrong; the victim must
speak not simply as an ‘I’, but in our voice.
The other reason for seeing whether and how we can reduce the
differences between tort law and criminal law is simply to make clear
the way in which, when tort law is understood and used as a matter of
vindication for wrongs, the distinction between these two types of law
becomes more porous, leaving us with a more nuanced set of choices
about whether a legally cognisable wrong should be treated (only) as a
tort or (only) as a crime – and about what either classiﬁcation is to
involve. Suppose that, whatever steps we take to bring tort and criminal
processes closer to each other, we will see reason to maintain both kinds
of process: a tort process through which individuals can, in their own
voice and at their own discretion, seek vindication for wrongs they
have suffered; and a criminal process through which we, as a polity, seek
to call to account those who commit wrongs that we should make our
own. When we then try to work out which kinds of wrong should
belong to each process, we face two sets of decisions. The ﬁrst concerns
which wrongs should count as ‘public’, i.e. should be recognised by
the law as wrongs for which a legal response or remedy should be
60 And what responsibilities or duties: see Marshall, ‘“It isn’t just about you”’ (n. 48 above),
and ‘Victims of crime: their station and its duties’ in M. Matravers (ed.), Managing
Modernity: Politics and the culture of control (London: Routledge, 2005), 104.
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available, at all:61 more precisely, for which kinds of wrong should a legal
response be available that makes their wrongfulness salient? The second
set of decisions concerns which of those public wrongs should be deﬁned
as torts, which as crimes, and perhaps which as both. It seems plausible to
say that every legally cognisable wrong with a direct victim is in principle
eligible to be treated as a tort; and if a criminal process (even if reformed)
cannot always provide victims with the kind of vindication that they
might properly want, that such wrongs should count as torts even if
they are also deﬁned as crimes. But which types of wrong should be
criminalisable?
C. Criminalisable wrongs
We might then identify three types of criminalisable wrong. First, there
are the wrongs that lack an identiﬁable victim who could seek vindication
(or, if the victim is dead or incapacitated, on whose behalf others could
seek it) – wrongs whose only victim is the whole polity.62 We might say
in such cases that the polity, rather than an individual victim, seeks
vindication; the offender’s punishment might then properly be seen as
‘community payback’.
Second, we might identify a class of victimising wrongs that may be
pursued as criminal, but only with the victim’s consent, or only at the
victim’s request – and the difference between these two kinds of provi-
sion might be important. If what matters is the victim’s request, we might
say that these are wrongs which are sufﬁciently serious, or sufﬁciently
inconsistent with the equal concern and respect that citizens owe each
other, that we should not leave their victims with the burden (both moral
and material) of having to seek vindication for themselves: we should, out
of solidarity, be ready to pursue the wrongdoers collectively, to make the
wrongs our wrongs – but only if the victims ask us to do so; if they would
rather deal with the wrongs informally, outside the law, or pursue them
as torts, or simply ignore them, we should not insist on taking them up.
If what matters is the victim’s consent, we might say that these are
wrongs which we think ought to be pursued (indeed, that the victim
ought to pursue them), for reasons to be noted below, but not so urgently
61 See text at nn. 37, 46 above.
62 A further question, which I cannot pursue here, will then be whether at least some such
wrongs should be dealt with as ‘civil’ or administrative violations, rather than as properly
criminal offences.
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that we should be willing to override the victim’s wishes, or impose on
the victim the burdens of the criminal process.
Third, we might identify another class of victimising wrongs (these
might be the paradigm criminal wrongs) that we will be ready to insist
on pursuing as criminal, even if the victim does not wish them to be
pursued – wrongs that we will be ready to insist on sharing (or, as the
victim might see it, taking over) as our wrongs, whether or not the victim
wants to share them. This, as we saw earlier, is a hallmark of our existing
criminal process, and is part of what motivates the charge of ‘stealing
conﬂicts’; the question then will be what, if anything, could justify this
kind of insistence, in relation to which kinds of wrong.63
One kind of answer to this question takes us back to punishment as a
distinguishing mark of criminal law: we have reason to insist on treating
the wrong as criminal because we have a collective interest in punishing
it; to which we might add that the victims of such wrongs then have a
duty, owed to their fellow citizens, to assist in the prosecution of such
wrongs.64 That interest might be preventive: we have a collective interest
in reducing the incidence of such wrongs by deterrent, incapacitative, or
reformative punishments. Or it might be retributive: if justice demands
that such wrongs be punished, we have collective reason to see that they
are punished. This makes punishment part of the rationale of criminal-
isation itself—we criminalise in order to be able to punish.
Another kind of answer is non-instrumental: we see these as wrongs
that we must mark, whose perpetrators we must try to call to account,
since not to do so would be to betray those values by which we profess to
deﬁne ourselves as a polity – values that the wrong so ﬂagrantly violates.
For the law to remain silent about such wrongs, for it not to require that
they be condemned and their perpetrators called to public, punitive
account, would be to condone them; we have, and their victims thus also
have, a duty to respond to them in a way that makes clear that they are
not to be tolerated, or committed with impunity. Punishment might
ﬁgure in this kind of answer, but not as the primary reason for criminal-
isation: we will see reason to punish such wrongs if and because that is an
63 This issue has become salient in the context of domestic violence: see M. M. Dempsey,
Prosecuting Domestic Violence: A philosophical analysis (Oxford University Press, 2009).
Even if the victim should not have a veto over the pursuit of such wrongs, our insistence
on pursuing them must of course be sensitive to, and will sometimes be properly inhibited
by, the harm that such pursuit might do, including especially harm to the victim.
64 A claim often made in police procedural ﬁlms, as police ofﬁcers try to persuade the
unwilling victim to make a formal complaint or to give evidence.
172 r. a. duff
Comp. by: Amoudha Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 6 Title Name: DYSON
Date:25/4/14 Time:10:11:12 Page Number: 173
essential dimension of holding their perpetrators properly to account.65
The Preamble to the International Criminal Court’s founding statute
is interesting here, when it seeks to identify (in admittedly rhetorical
terms) the kinds of wrong that should fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction:
these are wrongs ‘that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’, that
‘must not go unpunished’; the whole international community must
‘put an end to impunity for [their] perpetrators . . . and thus . . . contrib-
ute to the prevention of such crimes’.66 The rhetoric is in part preventive,
but also speaks to a sense that independently of such instrumental
concerns, we must collectively respond to such wrongs (although we
need to be very cautious both about the thought that we ‘must’ respond
and about the form that a response should take).
3. Concluding remarks
I have not tried here to offer some set of determinate master principles or
criteria by which we can decide which wrongs should be criminal, and
which (only) tortious – I doubt that any such set of principles or criteria
can be provided. My aim has been instead to show how, if tort law is
(at least sometimes) concerned with the vindication of wrongs rather
than with the allocation of costs, the distinction, and the proper division
of normative labour, between tort law and criminal law become less clear
cut. We might indeed, I have suggested, blur the distinction further, by
revising our understanding of criminal law, and reforming the criminal
process, in ways that make the vindication of victims’ rights more central
to criminal law, and give victims a more active role in the criminal
process. In the end, however, we will still need to recognise a set of
wrongs, many at least of which are victimising wrongs, which should be
collectively pursued as wrongs even if the victim does not want this –
wrongs for which we recognise a collective duty to mark and condemn,
and on whose perpetrators we recognise a collective duty to call to
account. Such wrongs form the core of the criminal law as a distinctive
kind of law: the question of which wrongs we should see as being of this
kind is a crucial question not just for criminal law theorists discussing the
issue of criminalisation, but for the process of public deliberation that
ought to inform a democratic process of criminalisation.
65 See further Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (n. 52 above).
66 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Preamble.
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